Duns Scotus, ‘The Unicity of God’ Notes

Section Four of Philosophical Writings: A Selection

It seems that ‘unicity’ is a different concept from ‘haecceity’, which is incredibly annoying

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Is there only one God?

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Arguments to the Contrary

The first argument is just a quote from Corinthians

The second argument: if a single God exists then many Gods must exist, since a plural is different from a singular in quantity rather than quality

Third, there are individuals which participate in something broader (as a person participates in a species), and these can be traced back to some individual essence (that of ‘person’). Since God does not participate in anything broader, this cannot be true; therefore, there is no single essence of God, but multiple Gods

The greater number of things is better than the lesser; it is of God’s nature to be the greatest; therefore, it is of God’s nature to be multiple

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Body of the Question

First opinion: the unicity of God can never be proven, but must be accepted on faith, since to prove God’s unicity would be to know his essence, which is impossible

Scotus’ opinion: there are 7 ways to prove the unicity of God (which, by the way, will break my number system)

Firstly, one can argue from the infinite intellect. If two Gods existed (the argument can be extended to any number), they would necessarily know each other perfectly. The first could know the second either essentially or not. If it knows the second without knowing its essence, it does not know it in the most perfect way possible. If it knows the second through its essence, then the knowledge of the first comes only after the essence of the second, in which case the first is not God. Since the infinite intellect has been proven of God, there can only be one God.

Secondly, one can argue from the infinite will. A (the first God) is entirely distinct from B (the second God). Every being loves itself more than anything else, if it is not a part of something broader. Therefore, A loves itself more than it loves B. But, since God is infinitely good, an infinite will must love God infinitely. Therefore, A is required to love B as much as it loves itself. This is a contradiction, and so is impossible

Thirdly, one can argue from the infinite goodness. The will seeks the greater good to love most. If two things were infinitely good, “then together they would contain more goodness than a single infinite good” (1963:87). As such, the will could never be appeased by a single infinite good, which contradicts the definition of an infinite good

Fourthly, one can argue from the infinite power. If two Gods existed, they would both independently be the total cause of everything. In such a case, everything that exists would have two total causes, which is impossible. Similar arguments can be made regarding God as final end and most perfect being

Fifthly, one can argue from the absolute notion of infinity. If an essence can exist in multiple beings at once, the essence is more perfect if it does so than if it does not. What is absolutely infinite cannot be less perfect than anything else. Therefore, if two Gods were to exist, each God would be less perfect than the essence of God; it is of the nature of God to be the most perfect and absolutely infinite, so this cannot be the case. Therefore, the existence of multiple Gods implies an impossibility

Sixthly, one can argue from the nature of a necessary being. If multiple of one being can exist, then there is no limit to the number of such beings that can exist. If multiple necessary beings can exist, since they’re necessary, an infinite number of them must exist. Therefore, if God can be plural, there must be an infinite number of Gods. Scotus just says this is false, without providing evidence, though if his claim is right then he’s right to reject the antecedent I suppose

Seventhly, one can argue from omnipotence. This is omnipotence “as Catholics understand the term” (1963:89), not simply infinite power, and this omnipotence cannot be proven, as he aims to show elsewhere. Since God is omnipotent, if there are multiple Gods, all of them must be omnipotent. If this is so then, by the nature of omnipotence, God A must be able to destroy God B, in which case the latter cannot be God. A multiplicity of Gods therefore necessitates a contradiction. If one objects that God B is not an object of omnipotence, since omnipotence only applies to what is possible but not necessary, the argument merely needs to be reformulated. God A, as omnipotent, would be able to will something which must therefore exist, but God B would be able to will that same thing to not exist, and there would be a contradiction

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Reply to the Arguments for the First Opinion

The reason the Bible states that God is singular is not that its unicity is impossible to prove, but simply that the people were too stupid to prove this unicity for themselves, and so had to be told

There is a distinction between singularity as part of an object, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, singularity as the mode of existence of an object. To know God to be singular in Scotus’ sense is to know singularity as part of God, not as the mode of God’s existence

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Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning

The quote from the Bible is referring only to false Gods

Number is unlike other grammatical functions, since number refers to something real (in the phrase ‘there are two people’, ‘two’ refers to something real; grammatical gender does not). To refer to God as plural is to refer to it in a way that contradicts the reality. To say ‘there are multiple Gods’ is a contradiction in itself

The third argument confuses two types of perfection. A given example of the good reduces to the good in general, which is pure perfection, for example. A given example of a person reduces to the person in general, which is not a pure perfection. Things of the latter type must then be further reduced to the first being, God

Lastly, the final argument for multiple Gods only applies if it is possible for multiple Gods to exist (that is to say, the argument is of the form that ‘if multiple Gods can exist, this would be better than a single God, and so multiple Gods must exist’). Scotus has, however, shown that multiple Gods cannot exist, so the argument fails

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As such, the unicity of God is proven

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Duns Scotus (1963), Philosophical Writings: A Selection (Walter A trans), Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, UK.